"Ambassador Morgenthau's Story"Primary Documents: U.S. Ambassador on the Allied Setback at the Dardanelles, 18 March 1915

Reproduced below are portions of the memoirs, published as Ambassador Morgenthauís Story in 1918 by Doubleday & Page, of the wartime U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau.

In the following extract from his memoirs Morgenthau offers his thoughts on the failure of the Anglo-French attack upon the Dardanelles Narrows on 18 March 1915.  In his opinion if the Allies had renewed the attack the Turkish defences were insufficient to repel a sweeping Allied advance to Constantinople - where Morgenthau believed that the populace would welcome the invaders with open arms.

U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau on the Anglo-French Setback at the Dardanelles, 18 March 1915

On March 18th, the Allied fleet made its greatest attack.  As all the world knows, that attack proved disastrous to the Allies.  The outcome was the sinking of the Bouvet, the Ocean, and the Irresistible and the serious crippling of four other vessels.

Of the sixteen ships engaged in this battle of the 18th, seven were thus put temporarily or permanently out of action.  Naturally the Germans and Turks rejoiced over this victory.  The police went around, and ordered each householder to display a prescribed number of flags in honour of the event.

The Turkish people have so little spontaneous patriotism or enthusiasm of any kind that they would never decorate their establishments without such definite orders.  As a matter of fact, neither Germans nor Turks regarded this celebration too seriously, for they were not yet persuaded that they had really won a victory.

Most still believed that the Allied fleets would succeed in forcing their way through.  The only question, they said, was whether the Entente was ready to sacrifice the necessary number of ships.  Neither Wangenheim (note: German Ambassador) nor Pallavicini (note: Austro-Hungarian Ambassador) believed that the disastrous experience of the 18th would end the naval attack, and for days they anxiously waited for the fleet to return.

The high tension lasted for days and weeks after the repulse of the 18th.  We were still momentarily expecting the renewal of the attack.  But the great armada never returned.

Should it have comeback?  Could the Allied ships really have captured Constantinople?  I am constantly asked this question.  As a layman my own opinion can have little value, but I have quoted the opinions of the German generals and admirals, and of the Turks - practically all of whom, except Enver, believed that the enterprise would succeed, and I am half inclined to believe that Enver's attitude was merely a case of graveyard whistling.

In what I now have to say on this point, therefore, I wish it understood that I am giving not my own views, but merely those of the officials then in Turkey who were best qualified to judge.

Enver had told me, in our talk on the deck of the Yuruk, that he had "plenty of guns - plenty of ammunition."  But this statement was not true.  A glimpse at the map will show why Turkey was not receiving munitions from Germany or Austria at that time.  The fact was that Turkey was just as completely isolated from her allies then as was Russia.

There were two railroad lines leading from Constantinople to Germany.  One went by way of Bulgaria and Serbia.  Bulgaria was then not an ally; even though she had winked at the passage of guns and shells, this line could not have been used, since Serbia, which controlled the vital link extending from Nish to Belgrade, was still intact.

The other railroad line went through Rumania, by way of Bucharest.  This route was independent of Serbia, and, had the Rumanian Government consented, it would have formed a clear route from the Krupps to the Dardanelles.  The fact that munitions could be sent with the connivance of the Rumanian Government perhaps accounts for the suspicion that guns and shells were going by that route.

Day after day the French and British ministers protested at Bucharest against this alleged violation of neutrality, only to be met with angry denials that the Germans were using this line.  There is no doubt now that the Rumanian Government was perfectly honourable in making these denials.  It is not unlikely that the Germans themselves started all these stories, merely to fool the Allied fleet into the belief that their supplies were inexhaustible.

Let us suppose that the Allies had returned, say on the morning of the nineteenth, what would have happened?  The one overwhelming fact is that the fortifications were very short of ammunition.  They had almost reached the limit of their resisting power when the British fleet passed out on the afternoon of the 18th.

I had secured permission for Mr. George A. Schreiner, the well-known American correspondent of the Associated Press, to visit the Dardanelles on this occasion.  On the night of the 18th, this correspondent discussed the situation with General Mertens, who was the chief technical officer at the Turkish Straits.  General Mertens admitted that the outlook was very discouraging for the defence.

"We expect that the British will come back early tomorrow morning," he said, "and if they do, we may be able to hold out for a few hours."

General Mertens did not declare in so many words that the ammunition was practically exhausted, but Mr. Schreiner discovered that such was the case.  The fact was that Fort Hamidie, the most powerful defence on the Asiatic side, had just seventeen armour-piercing shells left, while at Kilidul-Bahr, which was the main defence on the European side, there were precisely ten.

"I should advise you to get up at six o'clock to-morrow morning," said General Mertens, "and take to the Anatolian hills.  That's what we are going to do."

The troops at all the fortifications had their orders to man the guns until the last shell had been fired and then to abandon the forts.

Once these defences became helpless, the problem of the Allied fleet would have been a simple one.  The only bar to their progress would have been the minefield, which stretched from a point about two miles north of Erenkeui to Kilid-ul-Bahr.

But the Allied fleet had plenty of minesweepers, which could have made a channel in a few hours.  North of Tchanak, as I have already explained, there were a few guns, but they were of the 1878 model, and could not discharge projectiles that could pierce modern armour plate.  North of Point Nagara there were only two batteries, and both dated from 1835!

Thus, once having silenced the outer Turkish Straits, there was nothing to bar the passage to Constantinople except the German and Turkish warships.  The Goeben was the only first-class fighting ship in either fleet, and it would not have lasted long against the Queen Elizabeth.  The disproportion in the strength of the opposing fleets, indeed, was so enormous that it is doubtful whether there would ever have been an engagement.

Thus the Allied fleet would have appeared before Constantinople on the morning of the twentieth.  What would have happened then?  We have heard much discussion as to whether this purely naval attack was justified.  Enver, in his conversation with me, had laid much stress on the absurdity of sending a fleet to Constantinople, supported by no adequate landing force, and much of the criticism since passed upon the Dardanelles expedition has centred on that point.

Yet it is my opinion that this exclusively naval attack was justified.  I base this judgment purely upon the political situation which then existed in Turkey.  Under ordinary circumstances such an enterprise would probably have been a foolish one, but the political conditions in Constantinople then were not ordinary.

There was no solidly established government in Turkey at that time.  A political committee, not exceeding forty members, headed by Talaat, Enver, and Djemal, controlled the Central Government, but their authority throughout the empire was exceedingly tenuous.  As a matter of fact, the whole Ottoman state, on that eighteenth day of March, 1915, when the Allied fleet abandoned the attack, was on the brink of dissolution.

All over Turkey ambitious chieftains had arisen, who were momentarily expecting its fall, and who were looking for the opportunity to seize their parts of the inheritance.  As previously described, Djemal had already organized practically an independent government in Syria.  In Smyrna Rahmi Bey, the Governor-General, had often disregarded the authorities at the capital.

In Adrianople Hadji Adil, one of the most courageous Turks of the time, was believed to be plotting to set up his own government.  Arabia had already become practically an independent nation.  Among the subject races the spirit of revolt was rapidly spreading.  The Greeks and the Armenians would also have welcomed an opportunity to strengthen the hands of the Allies.

The existing financial and industrial conditions seemed to make revolution inevitable.  Many farmers went on strike; they had no seeds and would not accept them as a free gift from the Government because, they said, as soon as their crops should be garnered the armies would immediately requisition them.

As for Constantinople, the populace there and the best elements among the Turks, far from opposing the arrival of the Allied fleet, would have welcomed it with joy.  The Turks themselves were praying that the British and French would take their city, for this would relieve them of the controlling gang, emancipate them from the hated Germans, bring about peace, and end their miseries.

No one understood this better than Talaat.  He was taking no chances on making an expeditious retreat, in case the Allied fleet appeared before the city.  For several months the Turkish leaders had been casting envious glances at a Minerva automobile that had been reposing in the Belgian legation ever since Turkey's declaration of war.

Talaat finally obtained possession of the coveted prize.  He had obtained somewhere another automobile, which he had loaded with extra tires, gasoline, and all the other essentials of a protracted journey.  This was evidently intended to accompany the more pretentious machine as a kind of "mother ship."

Talaat stationed these automobiles on the Asiatic side of the city with chauffeurs constantly at hand.  Everything was prepared to leave for the interior of Asia Minor at a moment's notice.

But the great Allied armada never returned to the attack.

Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. III, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923